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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. WHETHER, AS PROVIDED UNDER THE COMPRE-
HENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPEN-
SATION, AND LIABILITY ACT, THE NEW UNION
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES MAY ES-
TABLISH A NATURAL RESOURCES TRUSTEESHIP
OVER NONPUBLIC LAND OWNED BY TIPPECANOE
LOGGING COMPANY DUE TO THE OCCURRENCE
OF A CHEMICAL SPILL ON THAT LAND.
II. WHETHER TIPPECANOE LOGGING COMPANY IS
CORRECTLY EXCUSED FROM LIABILITY UNDER
THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RE-
SPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT
SECTION 107(b) ACT OF GOD DEFENSE, THIRD
PARTY DEFENSE, OR A COMBINATION OF THE
DEFENSES.
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OPINION BELOW
The unreported opinion of the United States District
Court for the District of New Union is set out in the tran-
script of the record, located at Appendix A. (A. at 1-11.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
This action arises from the sale of land and operation of a
mining facility in Harrison Forest, an area of vast natural re-
source in the state of New Union. Growing among the hard-
wood in Harrison Forest is the purple daisy, a wildflower
listed as endangered under the Endangered Species Act
("ESA"). (A. at 1.) This daisy is centralized and flourishes in
a small area of the forest; however, it has never been a resi-
dent of an area known as "Site 18." (A. at 10.) One of the
unique characteristics of the purple daisy is its relationship
with the green swallow, a bird which at the present time has
not been listed as endangered or threatened by the U.S. De-
partment of the Interior. (A. at 2.) Once every four years,
this swallow passes through Harrison Forest where it lays its
eggs on the leaves of the purple daisies, leaving the egg shell
nutrients in the forest soil for the purple daisy after the
hatchlings leave. (A. at 1.) Also, Harrison Forest is the only
known habitat of the blue robin, which is currently listed as
1994] 731
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endangered under the ESA. (A. at 2.) None of the 50 nesting
pairs residing in the forest make their homes in the location
known as Site 18. (A. 2, 10.)
In September of 1989, a rich vein of unionite ore was dis-
covered in the earth beneath Harrison Forest. (A. at 2.) At
the time of this discovery, most of the forest was owned by
Tippecanoe Logging Company ("TLC"). (A. at 1.) However,
shortly after this discovery, on September 30, TLC sold Site
18, the small portion of the forest which contained the richest
vein of ore. (A. at 2.) This sale was made to Mine-Finders, a
venture capital firm specializing in matching new mining
sites with companies that can develop them. (A. at 2.) Mine-
Finders paid $200,000 for Site 18 and received a deed in fee
simple absolute. (A. 2 - 3.) Later that year Mine-Finder's lo-
cated Tyler-2 Mining ("T2M") as a prospective purchaser for
Site 18. (A. at 2.)
Site 18 was sold by Mine-Finders to T2M on November
30, 1989 for $275,000 cash. (A. 2 - 3.) In return, Mine-Find-
ers conveyed Site 18 to T2M by deed in fee simple absolute.
(A. at 3.) Included with the deed was a transferable right of
entry and exit to Site 18 on Access Road #5, which is a private
road owned and maintained by TLC. (A. at 3.) At the time of
the sale of Site 18, T2M was attempting to win zoning ap-
proval from the Harrison County Board of Supervisors. For
this reason, T2M inserted a provision in the deed warranting
it would use an independent contractor' to operate and main-
tain the surface impoundment. (A. at 3.) This deed provision
also required T2M to arrange for annual environmental au-
dits of its operations. (A. at 3.) Further, T2M held all of the
required environmental permits under federally authorized
programs administered by the New Union Department of En-
vironmental Protection ("NUDEP"). (A. at 3.) The parties
have stipulated that all of the actions in operating and main-
taining the impoundment structure were the responsibility of
T2M through its contractor, a "third party" to TLC. (A. at 7.)
1. The contractor was to be approved by the New Union Department of
Environmental Protection. (A. at 3)
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss2/7
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Audits on the T2M sites have never revealed any defi-
ciencies. (A. at 3 - 4.) Moreover, on April 23, 1992, NUDEP
inspectors visiting the site found no violations or cause for
concern and gave the site its highest approval. (A. at 4.)
However, on the afternoon of April 26, 1993, Harrison Forest
experienced its heaviest rainfall in over ten years. (A. at 4.)
Unfortunately, on April 27, 1992, one day after this tremen-
dous rainfall, a crack developed in the surface impoundment
wall, and leachate2 from the mining operation poured out
through this crack, covering a small area of the forest in a
fifteen minute time period. (A. at 4.) The parties have stipu-
lated that the crack developed due to the heavy volume of liq-
uid contained in the impoundment. (A. at 4.)
The environmental damage caused by this incident af-
fects the areas inhabited by the purple daisy and the blue
robin. (A. at 10.) Although all of the daisies in the spill area
withered and died within days of the impoundment break,
ten percent of the former population still flourishes in the for-
est. (A. at 4.) At this time the spill has yet to effect the blue
robin, however, the trees and shrubs in which it nests have
absorbed the leachate into their root system, and it has been
stipulated that they will be dead in 5 to 8 years. (A. at 4.)
B. Procedural History
The New Union Department of Natural Resource,
through a memorandum agreement with the U.S. Depart-
ment of Interior, was authorized to serve as natural resources
trustee under section 107(f)(2)(B) of Compressive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CER-
CLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(B). (A. at 5.) As trustee the
NUDNR brought suit in the United States District Court for
the District of New Union seeking natural resources damages
from TLC and T2M under CERCLA § 107(a)(1-4)(C), 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2)(B). (A. at 5.) The NUDNR trustee specif-
2. T2M uses a leaching process to wash waste rock away from the unionite
ore. This leachate, which is highly acidic and toxic to plant life, runs through a
drainage channel to a surface impoundment. (A-3). This impoundment is
drained for -disposal every 45 days. (A-3). On the day of the incident, the im-
poundment was in Day 44 of this cycle. (A-4).
1994] 733
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ically sought damages for the relocation of the purple daisy to
an area unaffected by the spill in the New Union state wilder-
ness area. (A. at 5.) Funds were also requested to study al-
ternative habitats for the blue robin. (A. at 5.)
At trial, the Honorable Judge R. N. Remus of the Unites
States District Court for the District of New Union addressed
two issues. First, whether a natural resources trustee such
as NUDNR can claim a trusteeship over privately held re-
sources. (A. at 5.) Secondly, whether the "act of God/third
party defense" alone or in combination, under CERCLA
§ 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) was available to TLC. (A. at 5.)
On the first issue, Judge Remus found that the Endangered
Species Act ("ESA7) was evidence of a congressional decision
to exercise substantial governmental control over endangered
species regardless of their location, and held that it was
within the province of the NUDEP to exercise the trusteeship
over TLC's land in order to protect the purple daisy and blue
robin. (A. at 7.) In addition, the court held that TLC was free
from liability for natural resource damage liability under the
"combination defense" of CERCLA § 107(b)(4), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(b)(4). (A. at 9.) The court concluded that a partial or
marginal showing of an individual defense can "[ac]cumulate
to a solid combination defense under 107(b)(4)." (A. at 8.) The
parties subsequently filed a notice of appeal in the United
States District Court for the Twelfth Circuit. (A. at 11.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.
A natural resources damage trusteeship cannot be estab-
lished on privately owned land. The provisions of CERCLA
mandate that such a trusteeship is appropriate upon land
which is owned managed or controlled by state, federal or for-
eign government, or an Indian tribe. The land at issue does
not fall within the provisions of the statute, so the establish-
ment of a trusteeship on this property would be in direct con-
flict with the provisions of CERCLA.
The State contends that ESA is evidence of Congres-
sional intent to control privately owned land, due to the pres-
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss2/7
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ence of natural resources upon that land. However, the state
has misconstrued Congress' intent in promulgating ESA.
Congress enacted ESA to protect endangered and threatened
species and preserve ecosystems. No where in the provisions
of ESA does it provide for natural resources damages trustee-
ships in order to protect these species. Additionally, the blue
robin and the purple daisy have suffered that type of injury
that is actionable under ESA.
II.
Tippecanoe Logging Company should be excused from li-
ability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, Liability Act's Act of God Defense, Third-
Party Defense or a Combination of the defenses. Tippecanoe
Logging Company is completely free of any fault in this un-
fortunate accident and explicitly fits into the defenses pro-
vided by CERCLA.
The magnitude of rain and its resultant effect on TLC's
land were unforeseeable and conclusively an Act of God
within CERCLA's provision. In addition, the release of the
hazardous substance was completely caused by an act or
omission of a third party other than one with even a remote
affiliation to TLC, clearly making TLC a prime candidate the
Third-Party defense. Finally, this court may even use a com-
bination of the Act of God and Third-Party defense to relieve
TLC of any liability.
Furthermore, if this court concludes that TLC cannot ap-
ply one of the defenses provided by CERCLA, then TLC
should be allocated zero liability. TLC is complete free of any
fault in this situation. If this court finds it necessary to hold
an innocent party, such as TLC, liable, then the court would
be effectuating an unjust result.
19941 735
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ARGUMENTS
I. AS PROVIDED UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE EN-
VIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND
LIABILITY ACT, THE NEW UNION DEPARTMENT
OF NATURAL RESOURCES CAN NOT ESTABLISH A
NATURAL RESOURCES TRUSTEESHIP, OVER
NONPUBLIC LAND OWNED BY TIPPECANOE LOG-
GING COMPANY DUE TO THE OCCURRENCE OF A
CHEMICAL SPILL ON THAT LAND.
A. A natural resources trusteeship cannot be
established on private land.
1. A de novo standard of review is appropriate to
review the lower court's determination of
this case.
A de novo standard is appropriate for this Honorable
Court's review of the District Court's determination in this
case. When reviewing a district court's interpretation of a
federal statute the court of appeals applies a standard of de
novo review. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287
(1982).
2. There is no statutory indication that a natural
resources trusteeship can be established over
privately owned property.
The NUDNR cannot establish a natural resources dam-
age trusteeship over the privately owned property of T2M in
order to protect the habitats of the purple daisies and blue
robin, due to their endangered status under ESA. The
NUDNR contends that a trusteeship is appropriate in this
situation, because the spill resulted in damage to these spe-
cies critical habitats. However, an examination of CERCLA
indicates that this type of trusteeship would not be appropri-
ate on privately owned land. Moreover, no court has conclu-
sively stated that a natural resources trusteeship may be
asserted over privately owned land.
The first step in determining whether a natural re-
sources trusteeship can be established over specific property
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss2/7
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involves an examination of the statutory provisions allowing
such a trusteeship. Under the provisions of CERCLA, state
or federal officials may establish a trusteeship "to assess
damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural re-
source." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(A) (1993). A natural resource
is defined as:
"land, fish wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drink-
ing water supplies, and other such resources belonging to,
managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise
controlled by the United States... any State or local gov-
ernment, any foreign government, any Indian tribe. .... ."
42 U.S.C.§ 9601(16) (1993). The purpose of such a trustee-
ship is to pursue recovery for natural resource damage from
potentially responsible parties. To assist the trustees in their
quest for damages, Congress required the promulgation of
regulations to provide guidance to natural resources trustees
on the determination of adverse effects of hazardous sub-
stances upon natural resources and attach damages. See
Thomas A. Campbell, Natural Resources Damage Assess-
ments: A Glance Backward and a Look Forward, 45 Baylor
L. Rev. 221, 225 (1993); see also 43 C.F.R. § 11 (1990). How-
ever, the nature of the land upon which a trusteeship may be
designated has basically been left unregulated, leaving the
ultimate determination to the courts.
The difficulty of implementing a natural resource dam-
age trusteeship to natural resources found on privately
owned land was addressed by the circuit court in the District
of Columbia in Ohio v. United States Department of the Inte-
rior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The Ohio court applied
the analysis set forth by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to determine whether a
natural resources trusteeship may be exerted over the pri-
vately owned property. Through their review, the circuit
court found that the language of CERCLA, which specifically
addresses the use of a natural resource damage trusteeship
on privately owned land was ambiguous, and remanded the
records of the case to the Department of the Interior for fur-
1994]
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ther clarification. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 461. Although the court
ultimately left the determination of this issue to the Depart-
ment of the Interior, the analysis and reasoning of the court
strongly indicates that such a trusteeship cannot be estab-
lished on privately owned land. Therefore, the reasoning of
this court must be examined in great detail.
The Ohio court began its analysis by pointing out that
the critical language of the statute provides that responsible
parties shall be held liable for the injury, destruction or loss
of natural resources. Id. at 459 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)[4](C)). Additionally, the court pointed out that the
statute defines "natural resources" as those resources "be-
longing to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or
otherwise controlled by the United States[,] ... any state or
local government, any foreign government, any Indian tribe
.... "' Id. at 459 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16)). The court rec-
ognized that the difficulty in determining whether a natural
resource trusteeship can be assessed over privately owned
land arose from the statutory language and specifically cen-
tered around the series of phrases: "belonging to, managed
by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled
by" a state, federal or foreign government. Id. at 459. How-
ever, the court pointed out that the text of CERCLA itself
contains an implied indication that Congress did not intend
resources under purely private ownership to be included
within the definition of natural resource. The court stated,
that the inclusion of the Indian tribe clause to the definition
of natural resources in 1986, was intended to include some
natural resources under purely private ownership. Id. at
460. "No such provision would have been necessary if Con-
gress either in 1980 or in 1986 had intended 'natural re-
sources' to generally include resources under purely private
ownership." Id. Therefore, the language of the court clearly
indicates that if Congress intended privately owned resources
to be included in this definition, they would have made an
affirmative statement to that effect.
The Ohio court also examined CERCLA's legislative his-
tory in order to determine whether the damage to private
property was covered by the natural resources damage provi-
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss2/7
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sion of the act. Importantly, the court indicated that early
drafts of CERCLA show that Congress considered whether
this legislation should cover damages to private property.3
However, the court pointed out that each of the drafts includ-
ing damage provisions for privately owned property was re-
jected. Id. at 460. Therefore, as the court states, Congress
deliberately excluded purely private property from the ambit
of the natural resources damage provision. Id.
Lastly, the court addressed the ambiguity of the Depart-
ment of Interior's regulations concerning the application of
natural resource damage assessment to privately and pub-
licly owned land. The court examined the preamble to the
Department of Interior's regulations and found that this was
the source of the ambiguity:
The Department believes that Congress has defined "natu-
ral resources" with sufficient specificity to leave no doubt
that resources owned by parties other that Federal, State,
local or foreign governments (i.e. privately-owned re-
sources) are not included .... The Department notes, as
stated above, that section 101(16) of CERCLA clearly indi-
cates that damage to privately-owned resources are not to
be included in natural resource damage assessments.
Id. at 461 (citing 51 Fed. Reg. 27,696). The court stated that
by taking these comments at face value the Department of
the Interior would exclude any privately owned property from
the ambit of the natural resource damage provisions. Id. at
461.
The court found that the Department of Interior did not
advocate a literal reading of the regulations. The court
3. The court specifically cites the language of a number of drafts to sup-
port this point. See, e.g. H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (1980), reprinted in
2 A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability Act of 1980 at 40 (Comm. Print 1983) (damages to in-
clude "all damages for personal injury, injury to real or personal property, and
economic loss, resulting from such release or threatened release"); H.R. 85, 96th
Cong. 1st Sess. § 103(a)(2), reprinted in 2 A Legislative History of the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 at
487 (damages to include "injury to, or destruction of, real or personal property");
Ohio, 880 F.2d at 460.
1994] 739
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stated that according to the position advanced by the Depart-
ment of Interior the only manner in which privately owned
property could be brought within the natural resources dam-
age provision was if a substantial degree of governmental
regulation, management or control was exerted over the pri-
vately owned property. Id. Since the Department of Inte-
rior's arguments and the language of the statute resulted in
abundant confusion, the court remanded the case ordering
the Department to clarify its interpretation of the
regulations.
Regardless of the ultimate determination in this case,
the court has explicitly advanced the position that privately
owned land cannot be the subject of a trusteeship under the
natural resource damage provision of the statute. Although
the court ordered the Department of the Interior to clarify its
interpretation of the regulations, the tone of the opinion is
clear: A natural resources trusteeship cannot be asserted
over privately owned land.
If this Court were to allow the NUDNR to establish a
natural resource damage trusteeship over TLC's privately
owned land, it would be in direct conflict with Congress' pro-
visions in CERCLA. The express language of the Act states
that such a trusteeship may be exercised over resources be-
longing to, managed by or otherwise controlled by various
forms of government or Indian tribes, it does not allow such a
trusteeship to be exercised over resources located on other-
wise privately owned or controlled land. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(6) (1993). Moreover, by allowing such a trusteeship,
the Court would be opening the litigation flood gates, by al-
lowing the state and federal government to intervene on
purely private matters. As the law now stands, private par-
ties are held responsible for natural resources located on
their property. It is undoubtedly shown in the legislative his-
tory of the Act that Congress chose this language in order to
hold private parties accountable for natural resources located
on their land. Therefore, this Court should not place such a
burden and responsibility on the government.
The area over which the NUDNR wishes to exercise the
trusteeship is clearly privately owned land. The effects of the
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spill manifested on land which has been held by TLC for a
number of years. The land neither belongs to nor is managed
by any federal, state or local government or Indian tribe.
Moreover, it is not appertaining to or held in trust by any of
these parties. Rather, the land is the responsibility of TLC,
its owner. Along with its ownership rights to the land, TLC
also acquired the rights to those resources located on this
land. If TLC did not have such a right, it would neither be
able to use the land for logging or sell any portion of the land
for mining. It would be contrary to the provisions of CERCLA
to employ a natural resources damage trusteeship over this
land, just as it would be contrary to TLC's ownership rights.
The government should not be burdened with the responsibil-
ity of the employment of the trusteeship over TLC's land.
The responsibility for these resources should be left where
the statute intended, in the hands of the private owner.
3. No governmental control has been exerted over
the TLC's privately owned property and,
therefore, this property cannot be the
subject of a natural resource damage
trusteeship.
Under the provisions of CERCLA, a natural resources
trusteeship may be asserted over privately owned land if that
land is managed or controlled by the State or Federal govern-
ment. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1993). However, the State of New
Union cannot contend that they have exerted any such con-
trol over the land owned by TLC.
In accordance with the regulations that were advanced
by the Department of the Interior subsequent to the decision
of Ohio v. United States Department of the Interior, private
property can only be subject to a natural resource damage
trusteeship if there is some form of government regulation,
management or other form of control exerted over such prop-
erty. -56 Fed. Reg. 19752-01 (1991). However, the source of
this type of governmental control must be found in treaties,
constitutions, statutes, the common law, regulations, orders,
deeds or other conveyances, permits, or agreements. Id.
1994]
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In Ohio v. United States Department of the Interior, 880
F.2d 432 (1991), the United States Department of the Interior
argued that the substantial degree of governmental control
needed to assert a natural resource damage trusteeship over
privately owned land can be evidenced by a state's common
law. The law in question required private property owners to
allow public access to their private property. The Ohio court
cited the United States Supreme Court's decision in Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988), to support
this contention.
The Phillips Petroleum Court addressed whether state
common law could require private property owners to permit
public access to their tideland property. 484 U.S. 469. The
Phillips Petroleum Court held that a state has ownership of
lands beneath waters subject to the tide's influence, and
therefore such access must be allowed on privately owned
tideland property. Id. at 484. The Department of the Interior
in the Ohio case cited Phillips Petroleum as an example of
when a substantial degree of governmental control can be
found based upon the scope of a state's public trust doctrine. 4
The land owned by TLC cannot be found to constitute an
area of public trust, such as the tidelands in the Phillips Pe-
troleum case. At this time the only areas which New Union
hold in such a trust are riverbeds and the shores of Lake New
Union. (A. at 5.) Moreover, in 1979 the New Union Supreme
Court held that privately owned land cannot be included in
the public trust. (A. at 5. ) The land in question is purely pri-
vate in nature. It is not open to public access nor is the road
leading to it a public highway. As stated above, the only land
which the State of New Union holds in trust are riverbeds
and the shores of Lake New Union. This land is neither a
riverbed nor a lakeshore. Additionally, in 1979 the New
Union Supreme Court held that privately owned land cannot
be the subject of a public trust; therefore, TLC's property can-
not be the subject of a natural resources trusteeship.
4. Mississippi's common law holds that the state owns its tidelands. Phil-
lips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 484.
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Additionally, the NUDNR cannot assert that the pres-
ence of Access Road #5 constitutes a form of government reg-
ulation, management or control over the land owned by TLC.
Access Road #5 is merely the available access road to T2M's
Site 18. This road is privately owned and managed by TLC
and is used purely for the mining and logging operations. It
is not a public road, and the right to its use was one which
was simply passed to T2M through Mine-Finders from TLC
under the deed provisions as a license. There is no govern-
mental control or management of this road by the State of
New Union and therefore no trusteeship can be asserted over
the privately owned land of TLC due to the roads presence.
There is no indication of any governmental management
or control over the property of TLC, which is the subject of
this litigation. The property is not tideland, riverbed or lake-
shore, and the road that leads to this property is not open for
public use. The NUDNR cannot exercise a natural resources
trusteeship over this property without showing some type of
management or control over it. Because there is no type of
governmental management or control over this land, no trus-
teeship can be exercised over it.
4. A natural resource damage trusteeship cannot
be exercised over the privately owned land of
TLC, since TLC is not an Indian Tribe.
The only instance in which CERCLA allows a natural re-
sources damage trusteeship to be exercise on privately owned
land is when such land is owned by an Indian tribe. See 42
U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1993). Therefore, in order to assert that
TLC's privately owned land can be subject to such a trustee-
ship, the NUDNR must prove that TLC is not what it actu-
ally is, a logging company, but rather is an Indian tribe.
The Code of Federal Regulations defines a Indian tribe
as a group of Indians, within in the continental United States
as one which the Secretary of the Interior acknowledges to be
an Indian tribe. 25 C.F.R. § 83.1 (1992).5 Pursuant to the
5. This definition is for the purpose of establishing an Indian group exists
as an Indian tribe.
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Code, the Secretary of the Interior is to annually publish a
list of all recognized tribes in the Federal Register. 25 C.F.R.
§ 83.6(b) (1992). An examination of this list reveals that TLC
is not a Indian tribe recognized by the Secretary of the Inte-
rior. See 58 Fed. Reg. 202 (1993).
Under the provisions of CERCLA's section 107(f), the
only private property that can be subjected to a natural re-
sources damage trusteeship is that which is owned, managed
or controlled by an Indian tribe recognized by the Secretary of
the Interior. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1993). Because TLC is not
an Indian tribe, a natural resources damage trusteeship can-
not be exercised over their privately owned land.
B. The Endangered Species Act is not evidence of a
congressional decision to exert substantial
governmental control over endangered species
located on privately owned land.
1. The intent of the Endangered Species Act is
the protection of endangered or threatened
species.
In light of the judicial and legislative disarray as to inter-
pretation of section 107(f)(2), the lower court in this case
looked to the Endangered Species Act as the basis for its con-
clusion that a natural resource damage trusteeship can be ex-
ercised over TLC's privately owned land. The District Court
held that the Endangered Species Act was evidence of Con-
gress' decision to exert substantial governmental control over
endangered species regardless of where they are located. (A.
at 6.)
However, the District Court, by allowing ESA to consti-
tute the basis of the natural resources damage trusteeship
over TLC's privately owned land has applied ESA in a man-
ner which was not intended by Congress. As it is widely
known, the purpose of ESA is to protect endangered species
and preserve ecosystems. Sweet Home Chapter of Communi-
ties for a Great Oregon v Lujan, 806 F. Supp. 279, 281 (D.D.C
1992).
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Upon ESA's adoption in 1973, Congress stated that it in-
tended the ESA to provide for "conservation, protection, and
propagation of endangered species of fish and wildlife by fed-
eral action." S. Rep. No. 93-307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973),
reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2990. The legislative
history of ESA reveals that Congress directed a number of
agencies to take steps in order to achieve this goal. To imple-
ment the Act, Congress directed the Secretaries of the Inte-
rior and Commerce to compile a list of those species which
were to be considered endangered or threatened under ESA.
In order to fulfill this directive, the Department of the Inte-
rior was also granted the "authority to establish an Advisory
Committee for consultation regarding the [endangered spe-
cies] list." Id. Further, this department was given the au-
thority to acquire land pursuant to the existing legislation.
Id. In addition to the provisions granting power to the De-
partment of the Interior, the ESA contains provisions grant-
ing authority to the states to develop plans for the
management of endangered and threatened species within
their boundaries. Id.
Under Congress' direction the ESA compels federal agen-
cies to guarantee that their activities will not "jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered species or threatened
species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of
habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary
[of the Interior] ... to be critical. . . ." 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)
(1993). In order to avoid jeopardizing endangered or
threatened species, ESA enables the Department of the Inte-
rior to acquire lands upon which they may establish conser-
vation programs. 16 U.S.C. § 1534(a) (1993). According to
ESA's legislative history, Congress intended land acquisition
to be an option which would allow the government to protect
the habitats of endangered or threatened species on privately
owned land. To this effect Congress stated "[o]ften, protec-
tion of habitat is the only means of protecting endangered an-
imals which occur on non-public lands." S. Rep. No. 93-307,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2989, 2992.
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In light of the legislative history of the ESA, the lower
court misconstrued the reach and anticipated "control" of
ESA to private property. ESA does not create property rights
for the state or federal government. ESA simply allocates
funds and grants authority to the Department of the Interior
to acquire non-public lands to conserve endangered species
and their habitats. The record in this case does not reveal if
any funds had been allocated to purchase any of TLC's prop-
erty. Indeed, according to the record, none of TLC's property
has been designated as a critical habitat for the blue robin or
purple daisy. Currently, the only action that has been taken
pursuant to ESA is the designation of the blue robin and pur-
ple daisy as endangered.
When Congress enacted ESA in 1973, Congress' desire
was to protect wildlife. When Congress enacted CERCLA in
1980, it intended to remedy hazardous waste disposal prac-
tices. The scope of CERCLA did not include the protection of
wildlife. 6 CERCLA itself or its corresponding regulations and
legislative history do not state or allude to ESA as evidence of
substantial governmental control in order to exert a natural
resource damage trusteeship over private land. To construe
ESA as evidence of substantial governmental control over
private property is an affront to the statute.
The District Court's ruling would expand the possible
reach of a natural resource damage trusteeship to the 1600
endangered and threatened specie and their habitats, beyond
that which was intended in ESA. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11,
17.12 (1993). Moreover, private property rights would be
eviscerated if the natural resource damage trusteeship provi-
sions of CERCLA were applied to privately owned property
upon which an endangered or threatened species happened to
be found. Both the state and federal governments would suf-
fer staggering monetary hardships if they were compelled to
6. Congress intended CERCLA to "provide for a national inventory of inac-
tive hazardous waste sites and to establish a program for appropriate environ-
mental response action to protect public health and the environment form the
dangers posed by such sites." H.R. Rep. No. 96-1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120. A Hazardous Waste Re-
sponse Fund (Superfund) was also created. Id.
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manage the proposed expansion of natural resource damage
trusteeships over privately owned property.
The intent of the ESA was not to place a burden on the
state and federal government by compelling them to take
charge over privately owned land which harbors endangered
species. Rather, the intent was to conserve and protect those
species. If the NUDNR intended to protect those species
present upon TLC's property, it should have complied with
the provisions of ESA and purchased the land. Without
purchasing the land, the NUDNR has no intended or implied
right to exercise a natural resources damage trusteeship over
TLC's private property.
2. Under the provision of the Endangered Species
Act, the spill on to Tippecanoe Logging
Company's land was not a taking.
A close examination of the facts in this case indicates
that the spill over TLC's property does not constitute a taking
for the purpose of the ESA. According to the provisions of
ESA the term "'take' means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect" a species listed as
threatened or endangered under the Act. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1532(19) (1993). However, TLC has not acted in any of
these ways toward the blue robin or the purple daisy. TLC
was not the party who caused the harm to these species,
rather this harm arose from T2M's negligent operation of
their mining facility. Therefore, the NUDNR cannot assert a
natural resources trusteeship over TLC's land due to the ac-
tions of another.
Moreover, there has been no direct harm to the blue
robin that would constitute a taking under ESA. The record
indicates that Harrison Forest is the only known habitat of
this species of bird. 7 (A. at 2.) However, the record fails to
indicate whether Harrison Forest has been designated as the
7. It should be noted that in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153 (1973), the Court sought to protect the critical habitat of the snail darter.
At the time the case was brought, it was thought that the Little Tennessee
River was the only habitat of that species. However, subsequent to the disposi-
tion in that case the snail darter was discovered elsewhere.
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critical habitat of this species, as mandated in ESA. 16
U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). Without such a designation, this court
cannot consider the stipulated effect that the spill will have
on the trees and bushes in which the blue robin lives. (A. at
4.)
In Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Resources,
649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th
Cir. 1988), the United States District Court for the District of
Hawaii pointed out that the only type of injury to the habitat
of an endangered or threatened species that is actionable
under ESA is that which causes irreversible habitat modifica-
tion, which would prevent the population from recovering.
Id. at 1077. Clearly, the injury to the property at issue has
not caused a decrease in the population to the blue robin, and
therefore the blue robin has not been taken under the stat-
ute. Although the purple daisy population has suffered due
to the spill on to TLC's property, they have not been extin-
guished, and ten percent of their original population still
flourishes in Harrison Forest. The record fails to establish
that the modification to the daisy's habitat is irreversible. In
light of the court's findings in Palila and the fact that ten
percent of the daisy's population still flourishes, it also can-
not be considered taken under ESA.
The NUDNR should not be allowed to exercise a natural
resources damage trusteeship over the property owned by
TLC, merely because of the existence of endangered species
upon their land. In accordance with the findings of the court
in Palila, neither of these species have suffered the necessary
degree of harm to evoke the statutes protection. Moreover,
since the NUDNR has failed to establish that Harrison For-
est is in fact the critical habitat of these species, no action
should be taken under ESA. Consequently, no trusteeship
should be exercised over this land.
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II. THE TIPPECANOE LOGGING COMPANY IS COR-
RECTLY EXCUSED FROM LIABILITY UNDER COM-
PREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE,
COMPENSATION, LIABILITY ACT SECTION 107(B)
ACT OF GOD DEFENSE, THIRD-PARTY DEFENSE,
OR A COMBINATION OF THE DEFENSES.
A. This Court should excuse Tippecanoe Logging
Company from liability under CERCLA Section
107(b)(1), Act of God Defense.
The Act of God defense is available to Tippecanoe Log-
ging Company to relieve them from liability under the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
Liability Act. The Act of God defense is defined in CERCLA
as "an unanticipated grave natural disaster or other natural
phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible
character, the effects of which could not have been prevented
or avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(1) (1993). TLC is a potentially liable party pursuant
to § 107(a) of CERCLA because TLC owned the property
neighboring Site 18 onto which the leachate flowed. 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1993). In order to be held liable under
CERCLA, TLC must be considered an owner of a "facility."
Facility is defined under CERCLA as:
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe
or pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or publicly
owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impound-
ment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, roll-
ing stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazard
substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of , or
placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not in-
clude any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1993). TLC is not the owner of Site 18,
where the hazardous substance had been stored. Addition-
ally, there is no structure located on TLC's property; there-
fore, TLC could only be exposed to liability under CERCLA as
an owner of a "site or area where a hazardous substance has
... come to be located." TLC only became a "covered party"
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under CERCLA because TLC's property is adjacent to Site
18, and the leachate which escaped from the crack poured
from Site 18 onto TLC's land. The hazardous substance came
to be located on TLC's property solely as a result of an Act of
God. Federal case law has supported the proposition that lia-
bility should not attach if an Act of God is the only cause for
the release of the hazardous substances onto another's prop-
erty. The court in United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp.
1053 (C.D. Cal. 1987), examined the nature of rainfall as the
basis for an Act of God defense. Based on the facts presented
to the Stringfellow court, the Act of God defense was rejected
because the rainfall was foreseeable and its effects were
avoidable. However, the court did not summarily dismiss
rain as a foundation for the proper application of the Act of
God defense. The court held that,
the rains were not the kind of 'exceptional' natural phe-
nomena to which the narrow act of God defense of section
107(b)(1) applies. The rains were foreseeable based on nor-
mal climatic conditions and any harm caused by the rain
could have been prevented through design of proper drain-
age channels. Furthermore, the rains were not the sole
cause of the release.
Id. at 1061. The Stringfellow court's holding reveals that a
reviewing court must undertake a case-by-case factual analy-
sis to determine whether the Act of God defense should be
invoked.
In the case at bar, the proper drainage channels were in-
stalled by Tyler-2 Mining, Incorporated. T2M employs all of
the required environmental permits under federally author-
ized programs. Moreover, all of the audits conducted on Site
18 have never revealed any deficiencies. In fact, NUDEP in-
spectors gave Site 18 the highest approval grade when visit-
ing the site just four days before the development of the leak.
Therefore, in accordance with the statute, T2M has taken all
precautions to avoid foreseeable natural events.
The Stringfellow court considered the rain to be "foresee-
able based on normal climatic conditions." Id. However, the
rain in Harrison Forest was the heaviest in ten years. While
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss2/7
BEST APPELLANT BRIEFS
rainfall itself may not automatically invoke the Act of God
defense, this defense is nonetheless applicable in the case at
bar because the rainfall was the most drastic that the area
had experienced in over ten years. Therefore, the volatile
and unexpected nature of the rainfall of this magnitude mer-
its the application of the Act of God defense.
Therefore, the amount of rain and its resultant effects on
TLC's property were unanticipated and an "Act of God"
within the plain meaning of CERCLA. Congress provided the
Act of God defense as a bar to the strict liability that CER-
CLA imposes. This court should apply the Act of God defense
to the facts presented in the case at bar. The rainfall exper-
ienced by Harrison Forest was exceptional, inevitable, and ir-
resistible in character; thus, TLC has satisfied the Act of God
defense and should not be held liable under CERCLA.
B. This Court must excuse Tippecanoe Logging
Company from Liability under CERCLA Section
107(b)(3), Third-Party Defense.
The third-party defense is explicitly applicable to absolve
TLC of liability under CERCLA. The statutory language of
the third-party defense pertains to the factual predicament
which TLC encounters in the case at bar. CERCLA explains
that the third-party defense applies to one who proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that a release or threat of re-
lease of a hazardous substance was generated solely by,
an act or omission of a third party other than an employee
or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omis-
sion occurs in connection with a contractual relationship,
existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant ....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1993).
T2M was the owner of the property on which the im-
poundment facility was located. All the parties have stipu-
lated that the operation and maintenance of the
impoundment structure were the responsibility of T2M
through its contractor. T2M is neither an employee nor agent
of TLC, and the only question raised is whether the deed pro-
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visions regarding the impoundment constitute a "contractual
relationship" under CERCLA. If a "contractual relationship"
is found within the meaning of CERCLA, the defendant
would be barred from utilizing the third-party defense.
1. Tippecanoe Logging Co. unquestionably did not
have a contractual relationship with Tyler-2
Mining, Inc. within the meaning of Section
107(b)(3) of CERCLA.
CERCLA defines a "contractual relationship" as includ-
ing but not limiting to "land contracts, deeds or other instru-
ments transferring title or possession." The facts explicitly
illustrate that TLC had a contractual relationship for the sale
of Site 18 with Mine-Finders, not T2M. Mine-Finders, in re-
turn resold Site 18 to T2M. There is no contractual relation-
ship, deed or otherwise, between TLC and T2M.
T2M and the New Union Department of Natural Re-
sources have contended that the impoundment safeguards
which were required by the Harrison County Board of Super-
visors during the transfer from Mine-Finders to T2M, are a
contractual relationship indirectly between T2M and TLC.
Even if this Court finds an indirect contract between TLC
and T2M through the deeding of Site 18, as previously men-
tioned, the deed that was transferred by TLC did not contain
the provisions regarding the impoundment safeguards. The
deed transferred by TLC was only a fee simple absolute in
Site 18 and a transferrable right of entry and exit on Access
Road #5. The "impoundment safeguards" required during the
transfer from Mine-Finders to T2M were not present in the
deed when TLC owned and transferred Site 18. TLC never
had any association with these impoundment provisions, and
the "indirect" contractual relationship would not include
these provisions.
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2. CERCLA and case law interpret the
contractual relationship clause to only apply
when the contract is "in connection with"
the handling of a hazardous substance.
The statute and case law clearly establish that in order
for there to be a contractual relationship under CERCLA, the
contract has to be "in connection with" the acts or omissions
of a third party who possesses some type of nexus with the
management of a hazardous substance. If a contract lacks
this requisite nexus, then the contract is not a bar to the
third-party defense.
In Westwood Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. National Fuel Gas
Distribution Corp., 964 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992), the court
found that "a landowner is precluded from raising the third-
party defense only if the contract between the landowner and
the third party somehow is connected with the handling of
hazardous substances." Id. at 89 (emphasis added). The
court found that "other cases considering this or similar ques-
tions also have indicated that something more than a mere
contractual relationship is required." Id.
The court in Shapiro v. Alexanderson, 743 F. Supp. 268
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), verified that the language in CERCLA's
third-party defense does not encompass all acts by a third
party who has a contractual relationship with a defendant.
"Such a construction would render the language 'in connec-
tion with' mere surplusage." Id. at 271. The courts have con-
cluded that "[w]ithout a clear congressional command
otherwise, [they] will not construe a statute in any way that
makes some of its provisions surplusage." New York v. Shore
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985) (citing
United States v. Mehrmanesh, 689 F.2d 822, 829 (9th Cir.
1982); National Insulation Transp. Comm. v. ICC, 683 F.2d
533, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
The only deed which could possibly constitute an indirect
contractual relationship is the one between TLC and T2M.
However, this deed did not contain any provisions "in connec-
tion with" the handling of a hazardous substance. Therefore,
the deed falls outside of the parameters of the "contractual
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relationship" prohibition. This Court must find NUDNR's
and T2M's assertion regarding a contractual relationship be-
tween T2M and TLC as being without merit. TLC is not be
barred from utilizing the third-party defense because the
statutory provision requiring that the deed be "in connection
with" a hazardous substances has not been satisfied.
3. The release or threat of release of the
hazardous substance was caused solely by a
third party other than Tippecanoe Logging
Company.
The facility which created the release of the hazardous
substance was solely owned and operated by a third party
other than TLC. Therefore, CERCLA provides for relief of li-
ability in instances in which hazardous substances were re-
leased by a third party.
Section 107(b)(3) of CERCLA provides no liability for a
defendant which would otherwise be strictly liable if the "re-
lease or threat of release of a hazardous substance and the
damages resulting were caused solely by ... an act or omis-
sion of a third party. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (emphasis
added). In addition, case law has continually stated that the
release and harm must be exclusive to the unrelated third
party. Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Company, 727 F. Supp.
1532, 1540 (W.D. Mich. 1989); United States v. Marisol, Inc.,
725 F. Supp. 833, 838 (M.D. Pa. 1989); O'Neil v. Picillo, 682
F. Supp. 706, 712 (D.C.R.I. 1988); Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp.
at 1061.
In the instant case, the environmental damage derived
entirely from the crack which developed in the wall of the im-
poundment on Site 18. All of the parties have already stipu-
lated that all of the actions in operating and maintaining the
impoundment structure were the responsibility of T2M
through its contractor. The contamination present in Harri-
son Forest, therefore, was caused solely by a unrelated third
party. TLC is free from any connection from the cause of the
release and harm.
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4. Tippecanoe Logging Company utilized due care
and precaution against foreseeable acts or
omissions of the third party responsible for
the release or threat of release.
Due care and precaution against foreseeable acts or
omissions of the unrelated third party have been specifically
established by TLC in this incident. Since T2M was neither
an agent nor employee of TLC, and no contractual relation-
ship existed between them, TLC must only establish by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that they,
exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance
concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of
such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and
circumstances, and ... took precautions against foresee-
able acts or omissions of any such third party and the con-
sequences that could foreseeably result from such acts or
omissions....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1993).
In Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 1528,
1543-1544 (E.D. Cal. 1992), the court found that the "due
care" requirement had been fulfilled by the defendant's in-
spection of their contaminated facility, as was required by a
legislative bill. The court established that due care must be
exercised in light of all relevant facts and circumstances.
In the instant case, T2M held all the required environ-
mental permits administered by NUDEP. T2M also had en-
vironmental audits performed each year, and none of the
audits revealed any deficiencies. Site 18 was even inspected
by NUDEP four days before the accident and was given
NUDEP's highest approval grade. TLC neither has nor ever
had control over the facility of Site 18. As such, TLC did not
need to take any more precautions since T2M had already
fulfilled all of its own requirements.
In Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 1528,
1543-1544 (E.D. Cal. 1992), the court recognized the defend-
ant as exercising due care and taking reasonable precautions
against the "foreseeable acts or omissions" of third parties
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when the defendant had tested and inspected their facility in
compliance with the state's legislative bill. Similarly, T2M
has also complied with necessary regulations and therefore
exercised due care as well as taken precaution against fore-
seeable acts or omissions. TLC, on the other hand, was not
required to test or inspect their "facility" because there was
no hazardous substance on their property. Therefore, TLC
has also exercised due care and precaution.
This Court should recognize that TLC has met all the el-
ements necessary to establish a third-party defense under
CERCLA. The record reflects that the release was solely
caused by the acts or omissions of a third party. Also, no con-
tractual relationship exists between TLC and a third party.
In addition, TLC has practiced due care and taken all precau-
tionary steps against foreseeable acts of the third party. It is
apparent that the drafters of CERCLA's third-party defense
provision had just the type of defendant such as TLC in mind
when designing this defense.
C. This Court must excuse Tippecanoe Logging
Company from Liability under CERCLA Section
107(b)(4), Act of God and Third-Party Defense
Combination.
Even if this Court's examination concludes that TLC can-
not be excused from liability under the Act of God or Third-
Party defenses, independently, it must find that no liability
attaches because of a combination of these defenses. Judge
Remus correctly decided that the CERCLA provision which
provides for a combination of defenses was appropriately ap-
plied to TLC. In fact, the lower court's decision concluded
that the combination defense is an accumulation of partial or
marginal showings of some of the individual defenses avail-
able under CERCLA. At a minimum, TLC has demonstrated
partial or marginal showings of both the Act of God and
Third-Party defenses.
Section 107(b)(4) of CERCLA specifically states:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this sec-
tion for a person otherwise liable who can establish by a
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preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat of
release of a hazardous substance and the damages result-
ing therefrom were caused solely by.. . any combination of
the foregoing paragraphs.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(4) (1993). If this Court were to eschew
the unambiguous language of the statute, it would be al-
lowing for an inequitable distribution of liability. CERCLA
explicitly provides for the employment of a combination of de-
fenses. Therefore, if the Court ignores this provision, it
would be tantamount to disregarding a Congressional direc-
tive, and the judiciary would be improperly acting as a super-
legislature.
D. If this Court finds it appropriate to hold
Tippecanoe Logging Company Liable under
CERCLA Section 107, Tippecanoe Logging
Company should be apportioned zero
liability.
Even if this Court determines that TLC should not enjoy
any of CERCLA's affirmative defenses, no liability should be
apportioned to TLC. CERCLA specifically allows courts to in-
stitute an equitable application of the statute since CERCLA
is couched in terms of strict liability.
CERCLA underwent a textual alteration when Congress
amended CERCLA by abandoning the necessity of a plaintiff
to prove the causation for the harm. Congress offset this
strict liability type standard by affording the judiciary the
discretion to apply CERCLA according to equitable princi-
ples. Colorado v. Asarco, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1486-88 (D.
Colo. 1985); 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1993). Hence, the principles
of common law tort liability have been integrated into CER-
CLA apportionment situations. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. at
1060.
In United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802
(S.D. Ohio 1983), Chief Judge Rubin correctly concluded that
a reading of the legislative history of CERCLA reveals that
the "term joint and several liability were deleted to avoid a
mandatory legislative standard applicable in all situations
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which might produce inequitable results in some cases." Id.
at 808. The courts have been given the discretion to effectu-
ate a fitting apportionment of liability. The court, in United
States v. Hardage, 116 F.R.D. 460, 465 (W.D. Okla. 1987),
stated that "[the judiciary] may impose joint and several lia-
bility where the harm is single and indivisible. However, de-
fendants must be given the opportunity to demonstrate the
divisibility of the harm and the degrees to which each defend-
ant is responsible." Id.
TLC is clearly free from any fault in the release of the
hazardous substances or damages that resulted therefrom.
TLC is unquestionably an innocent victim to an unfortunate
accident. For this court to allocate anything other than zero
liability would constitute an inequitable result.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Tippecanoe Logging Company
respectfully requests this Honorable Court reverse the judg-
ment of the United States District Court for the District of
New Union therefore removing the natural resources damage
trusteeship established by the NUDNR upon their land, and
affirm the District Court's decision finding Tippecanoe Log-
ging Company free from liability under CERCLA § 107(b)(4).
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